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COMBATING GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION:  
SUING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VIA A 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL 
RICO STATUTE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A freely associated group of criminals claims sovereignty over a 
poverty-stricken neighborhood in New York City.1  This family of 
lawbreakers, commonly known as the Mafia, possesses a shared 
organizational structure and code of conduct.2  The Mafia’s primary goal 
is protection racketeering, but it also engages in contract killing, drug 
trafficking, counterfeiting, fraud, loan sharking, and political 
corruption.3  The Godfather or the Don, who is the leader or boss of the 
Mafia, orders members of his Mafia family to commit these particular 
crimes to secure profit for the family and gain respect from the other 
members.4  Criminal organizations—such as the Mafia—have illegally 
accrued billions of dollars in revenue since approximately 1920; 
however, attempting to regulate organized crime, Congress enacted the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act.5  
                                                 
1 This hypothetical was created by the author to illustrate the concept of organized 
crime. 
2 See Andrew Lawless, Cosa Nostra—Rebranding the Mafia, THREE MONKEYS ONLINE 
(June 2005), http://www.threemonkeysonline.com/als/_cosa_nostra_history_sicilian_ 
mafia.html (discussing the origin of the Mafia, also known as La Cosa Nostra, which is a 
hierarchical criminal organization based in Sicily, Italy). 
3 See Racketeering:  Organized Criminal Activities, LAWYERS.COM, http://criminal.lawyers. 
com/Criminal-Law-Basics/Racketeering-Organized-Criminal-Activities.html (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2011) (defining protection racketeering as an extortion scheme through which a 
criminal group or individual coerces other less powerful entities to pay money for 
protection services). 
4 See Jeffrey E. Grell, Introduction, RICOACT.COM LLC, http://ricoact.com/?page_id=21 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2011) (explaining RICO in the Mafia context, with the Godfather as the 
target of the statute).  One can comprehend RICO most easily in the Mafia context, where 
the defendant is the Godfather.  Id.  The “racketeering activity” consists of the Mafia’s 
continuous criminal acts, e.g., bribery, extortion, murder, illegal drug sales, prostitution, 
etc.  Id.  Since the Mafia has engaged in these illegal activities for generations, the criminal 
actions can be considered a “pattern of racketeering activity”; thus, the government can 
prosecute the Godfather under RICO, even if he never personally engaged in the criminal 
behavior, because he operated and managed an enterprise that engaged in these acts.  Id.  
Also, the victims of the criminal activity can sue the Godfather civilly to recover the 
economic damages that they suffered as a result of the Mafia’s pattern of racketeering 
activity.  Id. 
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).  RICO has generally been categorized as the “organized 
crime” statute, but can also be used to fight government corruption.  United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).  G. Robert Blakey, who played a major role in drafting 
the statute, will not expressly provide the reasoning for the title “RICO.”  See G. Robert 
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Unfortunately, the RICO Act can only regulate organized crime to a 
certain extent, so problems arise when corruption reaches the federal 
government.6 
In light of the lack of supervision among government agencies, 
dishonest government officials have ultimately deprived “the public of 
its right to a government free from corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.”7  
This is made evident when the government’s RICO violations directly 
result in environmental and economic catastrophes, such as the recent oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.8  For example, British Petroleum (“BP”) is 
facing a class action suit under the federal civil RICO statute for its 
alleged scheme to secure revenue by committing a pattern of criminal 
                                                                                                             
Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):  Basic 
Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1025 n.91 (1980) [hereinafter 
Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts] (providing an explanation for the development of 
RICO’s title).  Contra Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 (N.D. Ill. 
1982) (wondering if the awkward title was based on the first Hollywood gangster movie 
“‘Little Caesar’”). 
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (outlining the scope of RICO); see also infra Part II.C (illustrating 
one of many potential disasters resulting from a government immersed in corruption); infra 
notes 19–20 and accompanying text (presenting one of many obstacles limiting RICO’s 
scope). 
7 Randy J. Curato et al., Note, Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse:  A Practical Guide to 
Fighting Official Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1983).  Government 
corruption often occurs when politicians intentionally fail to disclose a conflict of interest in 
matters involving their political authority.  Id.  Also, a politician who makes a statement to 
the public intending “to personally benefit from a program currently under 
consideration”—in effect “depriv[ing] citizens of the honest and faithful participation of 
[their] public official[s]”—corrupts governmental affairs.  Id. at 1042–43; see United States v. 
Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 653 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding a city employee guilty of mail fraud in 
defrauding the citizens of the city, the mayor, and the employees and officials of the city 
out of their right to his loyal and faithful services, their right to have the city’s business 
conducted honestly and impartially, their right to be aware of all pertinent facts when 
analyzing, negotiating, entering into, and renewing contracts with persons in companies 
seeking to do business with the city by failing to disclose his interest in a company to which 
the city awarded a contract, and using the mails in furtherance of his scheme); United 
States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1098 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding the former clerk of Cook 
County, Illinois, guilty of mail fraud, interstate travel in aid of racketeering activities, and 
attempting to evade income taxes when using the mail to further his scheme to defraud the 
citizens of Cook County); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(convicting former state Governor and former Director of State Department of Revenue of 
conspiracy, use of interstate facilities in furtherance of mail fraud, tax evasion and making 
false statements to Internal Revenue agents and the former Governor when defrauding the 
State of Illinois, its citizens, or the racing associations “‘out of something of definable value, 
money or property’”). 
8 See generally Amended Complaint, Rinke v. BP, P.L.C., No. 3:10CV00206 (N.D. Fla. 
filed Aug. 17, 2010) (providing a background of the oil spill allegedly caused by BP’s greed 
and fraudulent conduct). 
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acts to obtain oil and billions of dollars in profits from offshore drilling.9  
BP is suspected of fraudulently acquiring drilling permits and lease 
agreements of federal properties from Minerals Management Services 
(“MMS”), the federal agency responsible for the mineral leasing of 
submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf, who allegedly 
participated in ongoing racketeering activity with BP.10  Although MMS 
is an alleged “enterprise” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), it is 
not named as a defendant in the suit.11  Allowing MMS to escape liability 
for its participation in BP’s scheme is unjustifiable; therefore, this Note 
proposes an amendment to the current federal civil RICO statute to 
directly address governmental liability when it serves as an enterprise to 
further a pattern of racketeering activity.12 
First, Part II of this Note will briefly provide the historical context of 
the RICO statute; it will present the legislative history, the relevant 
background information, and other efforts to regulate government 
liability.13  Next, Part III offers an analysis of the current RICO statute 
and how it fails to accomplish its framers’ intentions.14  Further, Part III 
illustrates the potential effects of neglecting to resolve the issue in the 
                                                 
9 See generally id. (discussing how BP misrepresented the possible dangers of an oil spill 
and greatly overstated its ability to control a major spill so as to better its chances of 
securing the Deepwater Horizon exploration drilling permit and secure profits from 
offshore drilling through its scheme of criminal activity including mail fraud, wire fraud, 
and money laundering). 
10 See id. ¶¶ 161–71 (explaining how BP infiltrated the MMS Enterprise to associate with 
and conduct or participate in the conduct of Enterprise’s affairs through the alleged 
racketeering activity); see also infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (illustrating how BP 
bribed MMS officials with gifts, such as golf and ski trips and tickets to sporting events, 
and also reporting that MMS personnel habitually consumed alcohol, used cocaine and 
marijuana, and had sexual relations with representatives at oil industry functions). 
11 See Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 161–71 (discussing the RICO enterprises 
involved in the BP oil spill). 
12 See infra Part III (discussing why the government should be held accountable for its 
actions just like any other enterprise).  Although those MMS agents who conspired with BP 
perhaps may be liable in their individual capacities under RICO because their acts are not 
within the scope of their authority as government employees, this will not sufficiently 
compensate all of the victims suffering as a result of the racketeering activity.  Id.; see also 
infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing how individual government agents 
can face personal liability for RICO violations); infra note 150 and accompanying text 
(presenting an alternative measure to subject the government to civil liability); infra Part IV 
(proposing an amendment to the federal civil RICO statute that addresses claims against 
the United States for its participation in racketeering activity). 
13 See infra Part II (providing the historical context of the RICO statute by presenting the 
legislative history, relevant background information, and an overview of the BP oil crisis). 
14 See infra Part III (analyzing the current RICO statute and how it fails to accomplish its 
framers’ intent in creating the Act). 
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near future.15  Finally, Part IV proposes a solution that not only holds the 
government accountable for its unethical actions, but also attempts to 
restore justice, which, in turn, will lead to a more secure environment for 
the citizens of the United States.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The prevalence of corruption among governmental entities has 
inadvertently led to a nation that permits its federal government to 
escape liability by granting it immunity from suit for violations of certain 
laws, including the RICO Act.17  Thus far, the Supreme Court has 
effectively avoided addressing whether the federal government is subject 
to civil or criminal liability for its participation in a “‘pattern of 
racketeering activity.’”18  To date, courts have held that a RICO action 
cannot be maintained against the United States absent an express waiver 
of sovereign immunity.19  The federal circuits that have considered this 
issue have given various reasons for allowing the government to escape 
liability under RICO.20 
                                                 
15 See infra Part III (presenting the possible effects of allowing the government to 
continue avoiding liability for its illegal acts). 
16 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the RICO statute that directly addresses 
claims against the United States when the government operates as an enterprise to further a 
pattern of racketeering activity). 
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006); see infra note 114 (presenting various instances where 
governmental entities served as an enterprise to further patterns of racketeering activity); 
see also Examples of Public Corruption Investigations—Fiscal Year 2011, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=228095,00.html (last updated 
Sept. 19, 2011) (providing numerous examples of public corruption investigations during 
the fiscal years 2009–2011 at all levels of government).  Although the majority of corruption 
appears to be most prevalent among state and local governments, corruption is also 
common at the federal level, but sovereign immunity prevents it from reaching the federal 
courts.  See infra Part II.B (discussing previous attempts to hold the federal government 
liable for unlawful actions and providing the jurisprudence under RICO); infra Part III.C 
(addressing how sovereign immunity prevents suits against the federal government); infra 
notes 68–70 and accompanying text (discussing governmental immunity). 
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (“‘[P]attern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the 
last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the 
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.”). 
19 See, e.g., United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 879 
F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1989) (“It is elementary that ‘[t]he United States, as sovereign, is 
immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . , and the terms of its consent to be sued 
in any court define the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” (quoting United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941))); see Andrade v. Chojnacki, 934 F. Supp. 817, 831 (S.D. 
Tex. 1996) (reiterating that courts do not allow plaintiffs to bring claims against the United 
States for its agencies’ actions under RICO). 
20 See, e.g., Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “‘government 
entities are incapable of forming [the] malicious intent’ necessary to support a RICO 
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Although the government cannot be named as a defendant to a 
RICO claim, an individual government agent can still face personal 
liability for RICO violations.21  How can the federal government 
rationalize avoiding liability for RICO violations while subjecting its 
agents to personal liability?22  This notion seems unjust considering that 
state and local governmental bodies are generally subject to tort liability 
for the acts of their agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior.23  
Additionally, a government agency can serve as an “enterprise” through 
which a defendant may engage in patterns of racketeering activity; 
however, this does not expose the governmental entity to liability under 
RICO.24 
Allowing government agencies to circumvent liability poses a major 
problem for victims who suffer as a result of RICO violations, as their 
                                                                                                             
action” (quoting Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 
(9th Cir. 1991))); Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that federal 
governmental entities cannot possibly violate RICO because they are not subject to state or 
federal criminal prosecution). 
21 See Grell, supra note 4 (discussing the unavailability of the sovereign immunity 
defense to a government agent who engages in racketeering activity because such acts are 
not within the scope of the agent’s authority as a government employee). 
22 See Lancaster Cmty. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 404 (providing the Ninth Circuit’s view that 
holding the “‘body politic’” liable for the criminal actions of its agents operating beyond 
the scope of their authority is bad policy, as “the taxpayers[] will pay if Lancaster’s RICO 
claim is successful”). 
23 See infra note 150 and accompanying text (presenting an alternate avenue to subject 
the government to civil liability).  Compare Castro v. California, 138 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1977) (denying the existence of an employment relationship regarding a 
prospective juror), with Hamay v. Wash. Cnty., 435 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa. 1981) (holding that a 
judge is not an agent or employee of the county, but an employee of the state; therefore, 
liability under respondeat superior is available because the principal has the ability to 
control the actions of its agents).  See generally 57 AM JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and 
State Tort Liability § 145 (2001 & Supp. 2010) (discussing the application of respondeat 
superior to government agents as a theory of vicarious liability).  To determine a state or 
local government entity’s liability for a tort committed by its officers, agents, or employees 
under respondeat superior, a relationship of agent-principal or employer-employee must 
exist between the governmental body and the officer, agent, or employee.  Id. § 152.  
However, the respondeat superior theory does not apply to § 1983 claims against state or 
local governmental entities.  See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 416 U.S. 658, 
691 (1978) (concluding that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 
tortfeasor, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 
superior theory”). 
24 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”).  A government agent extorting 
persons under “color of authority” is participating in the governmental entity’s affairs.  
Grell, supra note 4.  A governmental entity that serves as a passive instrument through 
which racketeering activity is committed, advanced, or concealed is considered an 
enterprise; furthermore, the governmental entity may also serve as a victim enterprise.  Id. 
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wrongful actions potentially cause severe economic injury or 
environmental disasters.25  Federal officials have no interest in creating a 
law aimed to remedy and deter their own unethical activities, a fact 
which also elucidates the lack of federal efforts devoted generally to 
investigating and prosecuting economic crimes.26  However, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201, among other statutes, has been used as an avenue to prosecute 
official corruption.27  To date, numerous government officials have 
engaged in unlawful schemes to secure profits, which have involved 
various acts of fraud, deceit, and soliciting or accepting gifts from 
prohibited sources.28  While racketeering activity among government 
officials is relatively common, and corruption continues to disrupt the 
                                                 
25 See infra Part II.C (presenting a recent misfortune where a government agency’s 
violation of the RICO statute resulted in significant economic loss to victims).  For example, 
former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich was accused of running a pay-to-play scheme that 
resulted in a $267 million racketeering lawsuit.  See Elizabeth de la Vega, For Governor 
Blagojevich, It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like RICO, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://archive.truthout.org/121108J (listing six charges against the governor of Illinois for 
his participation in a six year pattern of racketeering activity with the very state he was 
elected to serve and operating an illegal enterprise used to further his scheme of money 
laundering, bribery, extortion, etc.); see also IRS, supra note 17 (demonstrating various other 
corruptive plots where the government’s criminal activity resulted in significant economic 
gain for government officials at the expense of United States citizens).  While evidence of 
federal RICO violations is scarce due to the sovereign immunity doctrine, and corruptive 
acts most often occur through lesser included crimes, RICO violations at the federal level of 
government are perhaps the most severe form of corruption because of their detrimental 
effects and the considerable number of innocent people who are affected.  See 115 CONG. 
REC. 5874 (1969) (noting Senator McClellan’s statements about the severity of organized 
crime when Congress first began making efforts to control it, specifically emphasizing that 
“[a]s the scope of organized crime’s activities has expanded, its efforts to corrupt public 
officials at every level of government have grown. . . .  [W]ith the necessary expansion of 
governmental regulation . . . its power to corrupt has given organized crime greater control 
over matters affecting the everyday life of each citizen”). 
26 See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:  Reflections on Bennett v. 
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 342–47 (1982) (noting that efforts against economic crime 
were underfunded, uncoordinated, and undirected at the federal level). 
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (criminalizing federal officials for both the offer and receipt of 
bribes and illegal gratuities); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 399 
(1999) (suggesting that § 201 is supplemented by what the Supreme Court has called “an 
intricate web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of 
gifts and other self-enriching actions by public officials”); Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the 
Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local 
Corruption:  Some Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 701 (2000) 
(proposing that § 201 is the most important criminal provision dealing with federal 
political corruption). 
28 See IRS, supra note 17 (revisiting a substantial amount of recent unlawful schemes 
where government officials secured significant profits through criminal activity); see also 
infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (depicting a recent example where government 
agents received gifts, drugs, sex, etc. from oil representatives in exchange for deepwater 
drilling permits). 
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government’s integrity, this issue remains a rather unfinished area of 
federal court jurisprudence.29 
Part II.A of this Note examines the framework of the RICO statute, 
including the key elements and explanations of ambiguous language, 
while also recapping its legislative history.30  Next, Part II.B recounts 
other efforts to hold the government liable for unlawful actions, using 
case law to illustrate the courts’ various reasons for permitting 
corruption.31  Finally, Part II.C describes the events leading up to the BP 
oil spill and the government agency’s history of participating in 
racketeering activity.32 
A. The Framework of RICO 
The scope of a statute must be initially determined by examining its 
text.33  Moreover, when interpreting the statutory language, ambiguities 
must be managed carefully by giving authoritative administrative 
constructions the appropriate deference to which they are entitled.34  
                                                 
29 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of racketeering 
activity among government officials); supra text accompanying note 18 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has successfully avoided addressing whether the government is subject to 
civil or criminal liability for its participation in a “pattern of racketeering activity”).  
Sovereign immunity bars claims against the government; however, Congress has created 
some exceptions that enable citizens to file civil suits against the United States.  See infra 
note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act as a limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity for tort actions against the government). 
30 See infra Part II.A (examining the key elements and ambiguous language in the text of 
the RICO statute, while also outlining the legislative history). 
31 See infra Part II.B (revisiting other efforts to hold the government liable for unlawful 
actions through case law). 
32 See infra Part II.C (offering a detailed account of the turmoil that led to the recent oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico). 
33 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); see Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 
55, 60 (1980) (“The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case concerning the 
interpretation of a statute the ‘starting point’ must be the language of the statute itself.”).  
Therefore, RICO falls within that basic rule, as the Supreme Court must look to RICO’s 
language to ascertain the legislative intent.  Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580; see also United States v. 
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980) (“It is a well-established principle of statutory 
construction that absent clear evidence of a contrary legislative intention, a statute should 
be interpreted according to its plain language.”); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 385–86 
(1805) (reiterating that the legislature’s words are to be “taken in their natural and usual 
sense . . . [and] every part [of a statute] is to be considered . . . [but] where great 
inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, 
unless the meaning of the legislature be plain; in which case it must be obeyed”). 
34 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
However, “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
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Therefore, Part II.A.1 will provide the foundation of the initiatives of 
RICO, including a detailed examination of the ambiguous language in 
the text.35  Further, Part II.A.2 offers an overview of RICO’s legislative 
history.36 
1. The Foundation of RICO 
Section 1964(c) of RICO authorizes “[a] person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” to sue.37  
                                                                                                             
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  
Id. at 842–43; see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786–89 (1975) (discussing the 
construction of Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act and noting that the general 
rule of statutory construction must “defer to a discernible legislative judgment . . . [as] [t]he 
Act is a carefully crafted piece of legislation”).  The Supreme Court has emphasized that an 
individual’s personal evaluation of a specific legislative course should be allocated in the 
process of interpreting a statute; rather, its task is determining what Congress intended by 
the particular words it used in the text of the statute.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 318 (1980).  To that end, the Sixth Circuit has found the literal reading of RICO to be 
consistent with the methodology used in Turkette where the Supreme Court recognized 
that Congress intended “RICO [to] be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes” in a civil context.  USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 
(6th Cir. 1982). 
35 See infra Part II.A.1 (providing the foundation of the RICO statute and offering a 
detailed discussion of the controversial language of the text). 
36 See infra Part II.A.2 (offering an overview of the legislative history). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).  The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 1964 provides: 
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to 
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by 
issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to:  ordering any 
person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any 
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or 
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting 
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the 
enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign 
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, 
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons. 
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section.  
Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter 
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall 
deem proper. 
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any 
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the 
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that 
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of 
securities to establish a violation of section 1962.  The exception 
contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against 
any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 6
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Under § 1961(3), a “person” includes any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.38  Although this word 
describes the entities to which the law assigns rights, Congress has failed 
to systematically define this ambiguous term; thus, issues arise when 
                                                                                                             
which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on 
which the conviction becomes final. 
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in 
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this 
chapter [18 USCS §§ 1961 et seq.] shall estop the defendant from 
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any 
subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States. 
Id. § 1964.  For § 1962, see infra note 42. 
38 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).  See generally Michael J. Gerardi, The “Person” at Federal Law:  A 
Framework and a RICO Test Suite, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239 (2009) (providing an in-
depth analysis of the term “person” in the context of RICO (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 defines all of the terms included in the elements 
that are necessary to establish a RICO violation: 
As used in this chapter— 
(1) “racketeering activity” means (A) any act or threat involving 
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, 
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed 
chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), 
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the 
following provisions of title 18, United States Code . . . ; 
(2) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or 
possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof; 
(3) “person” includes any individual or entity capable of holding a 
legal or beneficial interest in property; 
(4) “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity; 
(5) “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of 
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding 
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of 
racketeering activity; 
(6) “unlawful debt” means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in 
gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United 
States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is 
unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to 
principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) 
which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in 
violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision 
thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate 
usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least 
twice the enforceable rate. 
18 U.S.C. § 1961. 
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determining whether municipalities are subject to civil liability under 
RICO.39  However, the language in the modern definition does not 
appear to include government entities in the term “person.”40 
Further, when analyzing the RICO statute, it is necessary to define 
what constitutes an “enterprise,” distinct from a “pattern of racketeering 
activity,” as one does not necessarily establish the other.41  Section 1962, 
which provides a list of prohibited activities under RICO, may be 
violated by “any person . . . associated with any enterprise . . . the 
activities of which affect . . . commerce, conduct[ing] . . . [the] enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .”42  Racketeering 
                                                 
39 See Gerardi, supra note 38, at 2240 (noting that personhood is difficult to elucidate 
succinctly in federal law because Congress’ approach to defining the term “person” has 
never been systematic). 
40 Id.  But see id. at 2264–67 (proposing two changes to the definition of the word person 
that would provide courts with better guidance when determining what entities or 
individuals are included in the term). 
41 See Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2245 (2009) (“[T]he existence of an 
enterprise is an element distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity and ‘proof of one 
does not necessarily establish the other.’” (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 
583 (1980))).  An “enterprise” is not the “pattern of racketeering activity,” but is an entity 
separate from the pattern of activity through which it engages; thus, the government has 
the burden of establishing the existence of an enterprise as a separate element in every case.  
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006).  The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income 
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has 
participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, 
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of 
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which 
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce.  A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes 
of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating 
in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be 
unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by 
the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their 
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of 
an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate 
to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do 
not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more 
directors of the issuer. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of 
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
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activity consists of a wide range of crimes from state-defined felonies to 
embezzlement of pension and welfare funds under federal statutes.43  
Additionally, § 1961(5) requires at least two racketeering acts listed in 
§ 1961(c) within a period of ten years.44  Seeing as Congress did not 
express its intention to limit the application of RICO on the face of the 
statute, one must further examine the legislative history to determine its 
comprehensive objectives.45 
2. Legislative History 
In 1951, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) established the ABA 
Commission on Organized Crime after the Special Committee to 
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce revealed the 
emerging problem of organized crime among legitimate businesses and 
state and local governments.46  Subsequently, the Commission reviewed 
numerous proposals to strengthen the laws concerning organized 
crime.47  Around 1967, when organized crime and racketeering became 
well-known in the world of government, business, and unions, the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
                                                                                                             
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the 
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
Id. 
43 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); see Curato et al., supra note 7, at 1095 (highlighting murder, 
robbery, and arson among other state-defined felonies included in the definition of 
racketeering activity; the federal statutes include the Hobbs Act, the Travel Act, and 
bribery). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); see also id. § 1961(1) (presenting the list of possible predicate acts 
that may be used to establish a pattern of racketeering activity); supra note 18 (defining and 
providing the prerequisites to establish a “‘pattern of racketeering activity’”). 
45 See infra Part II.A.2 (offering an overview of the legislative history of RICO). 
46 Organized Crime Control:  Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals before Subcomm. No. 5 of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 538, 544 (1970) (testimony of ABA President 
Edward L. Wright) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; see id. (noting that the ABA 
Commission on Organized Crime was established in response to Senator Estes Kefauver’s 
request; he was Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in 
Interstate Commerce (also called the Kefauver Committee)). 
47 See House Hearings, supra note 46 (noting that the ABA Commission on Organized 
Crime examined various legislative proposals to strengthen the laws concerning organized 
crime; for instance, some measures “recognized that money [was] the key to power in the 
underworld”).  Hearings began to expose the structure of the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra by 
1960, while the Department of Justice began attempts to control racketeer infiltration 
among unions through antitrust theories.  See generally Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, 
supra note 5, at 1015 n.23 (noting that the McClellan Committee held hearings exposing the 
structure of the “national syndicate of organized crime”). 
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Justice (“the Katzenbach Commission”) recommended a crime control 
strategy that advocated the use of new approaches to control infiltration 
of legitimate businesses.48  After reexamining federal criminal 
jurisprudence between 1966 and 1971, the National Commission on 
Reform of the Federal Criminal Law further developed noteworthy 
perspectives regarding the disposition of the issues facing Congress.49 
                                                 
48 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200–09 (1967) (presenting the Commission’s 
recommendations of certain methods to successfully implement a full-scale commitment to 
destroy the power of organized crime groups).  Additionally, “racketeering” has never 
been a term limited to organized crime in the mob sense and has been applied broadly to 
an assortment of criminal schemes, including illegal businesses; however, its origin 
remains unclear.  GUS TYLER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA:  A BOOK OF READINGS 181–82 
(1962).  One theory notes that the term “racket” originates from young men in New York 
City, under the guidance of political leaders, giving affairs called rackets, whereby they 
associated themselves with gang-members who found it easy to force tradesmen to buy 
tickets.  Id.  For that reason, obtaining money by coercion or fraud developed into the term 
“racketeering.”  Id.  On the other hand, the Copeland Committee used the term loosely to 
describe any questionable, fraudulent, disliked, or immoral practice, regardless of whether 
it was criminal.  S. REP. NO. 75-1189, at 2 (1937).  Currently, RICO labels the accused as a 
racketeer, which has a prejudicial impact on adjudicators.  ABA:  REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES, SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (1982).  In 1934, the Copeland Committee 
heard a convincing argument that it was the public’s and officials’ reluctance to control 
“white-collar crime” that led to the development of “organized crime” during prohibition, 
which persistently emphasized: 
Both crime and racketeering of today have derived their ideals and 
methods from the business and financial practices of the last 
generation. . . . It is a law of social psychology . . . that the socially 
inferior tend to ape the socially superior. . . . It was inevitable that, 
sooner or later, we would succeed in “Americanizing” the “small 
fry”—especially the foreign small fry. . . . All was relatively safe, since 
the legal profession was already ethically impaired through its 
affiliations with the reputable racketeers. . . . The idea that when 
prohibition is ended the racketeers . . . will meekly and contritely turn 
back to blacking shoes . . . is downright silly.  They will apply the 
technique they have mastered to the dope ring . . . . They will find 
crafty lawyers all too willing to defend them from the “strong arm” of 
the law for value received. . . . So long as the lawless can get protection 
in return for keeping corrupt politicians in office, we shall not be free 
from the crime millstone about our necks. 
Investigation of So-Called “Rackets”:  Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, 73d Cong. 710–12 (1934) (testimony of Harry Elmer Barnes). 
49 See G. Robert Blakey et al., Introduction Memorandum and Excerpts from Consultants 
Report on Conspiracy and Organized Crime, in 1 WORKING PAPERS:  NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 381 (1970) (noting that the staff working for the 
Commission examined several concepts subsequently incorporated into RICO, such as 
“enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering”; also, the staff work indicated the narrow scope 
of predicate offenses in RICO during the earliest stages of the legislative process).  The 
National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Law was created  by Act of Nov. 
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On January 15, 1969, Senator John L. McClellan drafted the 
Organized Crime Control Act (“S. 30”) to deploy the recommendations 
from the Katzenbach Commission.50  Subsequently, he presented the 
evolution of organized crime in the United States, emphasizing the 
common practices of loan sharking, the infiltration of businesses, and the 
subversion of democratic processes.51  Focusing on Senator McClellan’s 
statements regarding the infiltration of the legitimate economy, Senator 
Hruska introduced the Criminal Activities Profits Act, which 
incorporated the features of his previous bills and identical bills 
sponsored by Richard Poff, the Congressman from Virginia, and was 
designed to attack “the economic power of organized crime” on two 
fronts—criminal and civil.52  However, Senator Hruska considered the 
                                                                                                             
9, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–801, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966); further, Edmund G. Brown was Chairman, 
and Congressman Richard H. Poff was Vice-Chairman.  Id. 
50 See Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 5, at 1017 (discussing the origin of the 
Organized Crime Control Act); see also supra notes 45–49 (examining the recommendations 
from the Katzenbach Commission); infra note 112 (providing the Statement of Findings and 
Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act). 
51 See 115 CONG. REC. 5872–74 (1969), reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized Crime:  
Hearings on S. 30, S. 994 . . . Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 493–511 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] 
(noting Senator McClellan’s recognition of the growth of organized crime in the United 
States and discussing emerging illegal activities, such as loan sharking, the infiltration of 
legitimate business, and the subversion of the democratic processes).  Also, Senator 
McClellan stressed the failure to prevent the growth of organized crime.  115 CONG. REC. 
5874; Senate Hearings, supra, at 496.  He further addressed the subversion of democratic 
processes: 
To exist and to increase its profits, . . . organized crime has found it 
necessary to corrupt the institutions of our democratic processes, 
something no society can long tolerate.  Today’s corruption is less 
visible, more subtle and therefore more difficult to detect and assess 
than the corruption of the prohibition and earlier eras.  Organized 
crime operates even in the face of honest law enforcement, but it 
flourishes best in a climate of corruption.  As the scope of organized 
crime’s activities has expanded, its efforts to corrupt public officials at 
every level of government have grown.  For with the necessary 
expansion of governmental regulation of private and business activity, 
its power to corrupt has given organized crime greater control over 
matters affecting the everyday life of each citizen.  The potential for 
harm today is thus greater if only because the scope of governmental 
activity is greater. 
115 CONG. REC. 5874–75; Senate Hearings, supra, at 497. 
52 115 CONG. REC. 6993; see id. at 6993–94 (describing the criminal and civil provisions 
incorporated into The Criminal Activities Profits Act).  The Criminal Activities Profits Act, 
S. 1623, also included provisions for private equitable relief and treble damages on its face.  
Id. at 6995–96; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 51, at 387–88 (examining Assistant 
Attorney General Wilson’s criticism of S. 1623, but expressing his fondness of S. 1861 
because of its useful civil remedies that could be invoked by the lesser standard of proof); 
Robert Taylor Hawkes, Note, The Conflict Over RICO’s Private Treble Damages Action, 70 
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criminal provision an ancillary to the civil provision, the intended focal 
point of the bill.53  Less than a month later, the two Senators introduced 
the Corrupt Organizations Act (“S. 1861”), which offered express 
provisions for relief in government proceedings and criminal sanctions.54  
The Department of Justice also conveyed its concern with the breadth of 
predicate offenses, advising that they were overbroad and could result in 
the complete federalization of criminal justice.55 
While S. 30 was amended to incorporate S. 1861 as Title IX, it was not 
intended to punish individuals; rather, its purpose was remedial.56  
Although S. 1861 did not include “fraud” as one of the activities that 
                                                                                                             
CORNELL L. REV. 902, 936 (1985) (“‘RICO claims can stigmatize defendants only if courts 
restrict the applicability of the broad statutory language to proven organized criminals.’”).  
However, Congressional intent might be thwarted if a particularly defined limitation 
focusing on classic mobsters was adopted to circumvent the scope of civil RICO because it 
might be viewed as carrying a stigma, thus leading to the adoption of a higher burden of 
proof.  Id. at 935–36.  Therefore, the implementation of these new remedies should not 
warrant separate rules of evidence.  Id.; see also Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
531, 547 (1871) (noting that an injured party may recover double or treble damages in a 
civil suit; however, those suits can hardly be deemed penal actions requiring the 
application of different rules of evidence). 
53 See 115 CONG. REC. 6993–94 (discussing Senator Hruska’s belief that the civil provision 
is the more important feature of the bill and further expressing the need for innovation in 
the fight against organized crime).  The bill expanded procedures that had been proven in 
the antitrust field and applied them in the organized crime domain.  Id.; see also State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (“[S]ection 1964(c) 
was . . . cast as a separate statute intentionally to avoid the restricted precedent of antitrust 
jurisprudence.”). 
54 See 115 CONG. REC. 9568 (discussing the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969 and 
providing the reasoning for its enactment).  More importantly, Senator McClellan never 
indicated that the express provisions for government proceedings were intended to 
exclude private parties.  Id. at 9567.  Although this Act focused heavily on the progressing 
remedies in antitrust law, he did not intend to bring that complicated field into the 
enforcement of the bill.  Id.  “There is, however, no intention here of importing the great 
complexity of antitrust law enforcement into this field.”  Id. 
55 Senate Hearings, supra note 51, at 404–07.  Congress acted because “existing law, state 
and federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of national dimensions.”  
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586–87 (1981).  The American Civil Liberties Union 
opposed the breadth of S. 1861 because it was applicable to areas beyond the traditional 
definition of organized crime.  Senate Hearings, supra note 51, at 475.  The Supreme Court 
reversed the Sixth Circuit’s effort to read a “‘racketeering’” limitation into the text of 18 
U.S.C. § 1961 because of the lack of limitation in the text and vagueness problems 
associated with reading an undefined concept into the statute; moreover, the confusion 
indirectly concluded that Congress intended to criminalize all conduct addressed in the 
statutory language.  United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 380 (1978). 
56 See 115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969) (emphasizing that the purpose of the bill was remedial, 
rather than penal).  The bill was based upon the consideration that organizations affecting 
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity are acting in opposition to the public 
interest.  Id.  Thus, the bill was designed to protect the public against parties engaging in 
organized criminal activity.  Id. 
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“harm[ed] innocent investors and competing organizations,” S. 30 
inserted it into its statement of findings and purpose; however, this 
blend of S. 30 and S. 1861 essentially narrowed the enumerated 
racketeering activities in Title IX.57  Importantly, Title IX provided 
various avenues to attack government corruption, including the state 
offenses of bribery and extortion, as well as the federal offenses of fraud, 
bribery, obstruction of justice, and extortion.58  When the bill was 
brought up for consideration in the House of Representatives, Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler characterized Title IX as a means 
through which injured private parties could recover treble damages—
one of the amendments the President had originally endorsed in his 
message on organized crime.59 
The House passed the bill by a vote of 431 to 26 after another debate 
regarding the scope of statutorily defined organized crime and 
racketeering activity.60  The text and legislative history appear to support 
holding a government agency liable for its RICO violations, yet it is still 
necessary to examine the jurisprudence regarding Congress’ intentions.61 
B. Previous Attempts to Hold the Federal Government Liable for Unlawful 
Actions 
Only a few actions against federal government entities have been 
brought under RICO; these cases provide various reasons for the courts’ 
inability to hold the government accountable for its violations of the 
                                                 
57 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922–23 (1970); 
115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969); see Blakey, supra note 26, at 268 (noting that the list of 
racketeering activities was narrowed, but was also expanded to include mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and securities fraud).  While Title IX was narrowed as suggested by the Department 
of Justice, the addition of fraud inherently included mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities 
fraud.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (providing the definition of mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343 (defining wire fraud). 
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (delineating the use of bribery to prevent government corruption); 
id. § 1510 (describing the federal offense of obstruction of justice); id. § 1951 (outlining the 
prohibited activities included in extortion). 
59 See 116 CONG. REC. 35, 37, 196, 264 (1970) (discussing Chairman Celler’s observations 
of Title IX and the President’s signing of the legislation).  Also, Title IX was designed to 
impede the infiltration of businesses by organized crime, which led to new civil remedies, 
including orders of prohibition against business activity, dissolution, and treble damages 
for injured parties.  Id. at 35, 196. 
60 See id. at 35, 204–05 (noting that Congressman Poff argued against an amendment—
offered by Congressman Mario Biaggi—explicitly prohibiting membership in the Mafia 
because he disagreed with the idea of confining S. 30 to “organized crime”). 
61 See infra Part II.B (discussing the jurisprudence under RICO); supra Part II.A (offering 
an overview of RICO’s legislative history and textual language). 
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statute.62  For instance, the Ninth Circuit has refused to acknowledge the 
government’s ability to form the “malicious intent” necessary to support 
a RICO action, as demonstrated in Lancaster Community Hospital v. 
Antelope Valley Hospital District.63  The Ninth Circuit also considers it bad 
policy to hold the “‘body politic’” (taxpayers or citizens of a state) liable 
for the criminal actions of a single government agent or a group of 
government agents operating beyond the scope of their authority.64  
Moreover, public policy is offended if the body-politic is “made liable for 
extraordinary damages as a result of the actions of a few dishonest 
officials.”65 
The Sixth Circuit takes a different approach, rejecting RICO’s 
application to government agencies because § 1962 requires racketeering 
activity as a predicate for a civil RICO action, which can only occur if the 
defendant is “‘chargeable,’ ‘indictable,’ or ‘punishable’ for violations of 
specific state and federal criminal provisions.”66  In Berger v. Pierce, the 
insureds sued the Federal Insurance Administration (“FIA”) for benefits 
under policies issued by the FIA, in accordance with the Flood Insurance 
Program.  However, the court decided that subjecting a federal agency to 
federal criminal prosecution would be an abuse of legal practice.67 
In addition to these justifications for permitting the government to 
escape liability for its unethical actions, the foremost reason that there 
cannot be a RICO claim against the federal government relates to the 
sovereign immunity concern.68  The jurisprudence regarding this issue 
                                                 
62 See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text (providing various reasons for allowing 
government to escape liability under RICO). 
63 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that “‘government entities are incapable of forming [the] malicious intent’ 
necessary to support a RICO action” (quoting Lancaster Cmty. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 404)). 
64 Lancaster Cmty. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 404. 
65 Id.  The court held that exemplary damages are not available against municipal 
corporations “‘because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for 
whose benefit the wrongdoer [i]s being chastised.”’  Id. 
66 Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991).  Although the Federal Insurance 
Agency (“FIA”) engaged in a RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d), the claim against the 
federal agency failed, as it is self-evident that a federal agency is not subject to state or 
federal prosecution.  Id.  Racketeering activity is a predicate for a civil RICO violation, 
which requires a defendant to be punishable for criminal provisions; thus, the claim was 
defective as a matter of law.  Id. 
67 Id.  “Aside from the fact that the elements of RICO have not been adequately alleged, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962, it is clear that there can be no RICO claim against the federal 
government.”  Id. 
68 See, generally John F. Conway, Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Federal Government:  An 
Application of the Proprietary Function Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 
707 (1987) (discussing governmental immunity and equitable estoppel).  The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity prevents suits against the government absent an express waiver.  Id. at 
710; see infra note 69 (demonstrating that the text of RICO does not present an unequivocal 
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under RICO is extremely limited because sovereign immunity bars 
claims against the government.69  As a corollary to sovereign immunity, 
the government has also been immune from application of the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel, which prevents it from being estopped from 
asserting its rights absent consent.70  Justification for these doctrines 
relies on the notion that claims against the government hinder the 
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the 
federal government.71 
An additional concern is protecting public finances.72  Equitable 
estoppel may result in compelling the government to provide a benefit 
                                                                                                             
expression of congressional intent to expose the government to liability).  But see, e.g., 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (illustrating one of the limited circumstances in 
which Congress has passed legislation waiving sovereign immunity). 
69 See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 99 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that 
governmental immunity from equitable estoppel arises as an incidence of sovereign 
immunity, which prevents the government from being sued unless it consents); supra note 
68 (reiterating that the sovereign immunity doctrine bars suits against the United States 
absent an express waiver).  While the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars citizens from bringing claims for 
relief or money damages in a federal court, unless the state waives immunity or Congress 
abrogates it.  32 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Courts § 981 (2007); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).  Congress has the power to 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when a statute contains an 
unequivocal statement of congressional intent to abrogate, Congress identifies the history 
of unconstitutional action by the states, and the rights and remedies created under the 
statute are congruent and proportional to the violation Congress sought to prevent.  32 AM. 
JUR. 2d Federal Courts § 981 (2007).  To determine whether Congress has abrogated a state’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court must clarify whether the “‘evidence of 
congressional intent [to abrogate the states’ immunity is] both unequivocal and textual,’” 
and Congress must have the power to abrogate according to the Constitution.  Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1024 (11th Cir. 1994).  Congress did not possess the 
power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when enacting the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act under the Indian Commerce Clause.  Id. at 1019. 
70 Conway, supra note 68, at 709–10.  “The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a 
party from asserting a claim or defense that otherwise is available to him against his 
opponent who has detrimentally altered her position in reliance on the party’s 
misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact despite a duty to do so.”  Id. at 709.  
Further, the primary principle behind equitable estoppel is that no one should benefit from 
his own wrong.  R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61–62 (1934). 
71 See Phelps v. Fed. Emerg. Mgmt. Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1986) (asserting that 
preventing the government from denying unlawful actions from its government agents 
results in the action of the official functioning as the law, as opposed to Congress’ enacted 
law). 
72 See Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty. v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 633 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(Meanor, J., dissenting) (“Where no substantive entitlement exists, to estop the government 
amounts to no more than a court authorized raid on the public treasury.”). 
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for a party when there is a lack of sufficient funds authorized by 
Congress.73 
In Schweiker v. Hansen, an agent for the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) misinformed Mrs. Hansen by advising her that 
she was ineligible to receive benefits; yet, she only had to file a written 
application in order to receive them, which she did one year later.74  The 
Supreme Court precluded the application of procedural equitable 
estoppel against the government agency because its activity was 
inherently sovereign.75  For government activity to be classified as 
sovereign, its actions must be “unique, and without analogy in the 
private sector.”76  Moreover, the policy considerations guiding the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity—ensuring the honest and effective 
administration of sovereign functions—must be strictly enforced.77  To 
that end, the Court considered the risk of opening the floodgates to 
litigation and the burden on public funding too immense to permit 
“government agents’ misconduct to result in circumventing a procedural 
requirement.”78 
                                                 
73 See Conway, supra note 68, at 711 (recognizing that estopping the government from 
denying an official’s or agent’s representation that is contrary to congressional legislation 
would result in the judiciary’s usurping the legislative function; hence, the act of the agent 
or official would be the law as opposed to an act of Congress); see also Heckler v. Cmty. 
Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., 467 U.S. 51, 62–63 (1984) (reiterating that estoppel is not 
justified when “the expansion of [an] operation [is] achieved through unlawful access to 
governmental funds”); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (recognizing 
“the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the 
public treasury”). 
74 Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 785–86 (1981) (per curiam).  After she began 
receiving benefits, Mrs. Hansen sued the SSA for retroactive benefits.  Id. at 786–87.  She 
argued that the Secretary of Health and Human Services should be estopped from denying 
the retroactive benefits to which she was entitled because the government agent 
misinformed her.  Id. at 787. 
75 See Conway, supra note 68, at 728 (“When the government functions in an inherently 
sovereign capacity, the application of immunity from equitable estoppel is most 
appropriate.”). 
76 Id. at 721.  Sovereign activity for equitable estoppel purposes includes “social security 
administration, tax collection, imposition of import duties, granting citizenship and 
permits, and purchasing munitions.”  Id. at 721–22. 
77 See Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 790 (stressing that experience has proven the written 
application requirement to be essential to honest and effective administration of Social 
Security laws). 
78 Conway, supra note 68, at 729.  According to the government, the public fisc perhaps 
could be threatened if the government was bound every time a government agent failed to 
follow instructions to the utmost detail.  Id.; see Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 788–89 (noting that the 
majority opinion agreed with Judge Friendly’s dissent in the court below, where he 
expressed his concern for opening the door of the federal fisc to thousands); see also infra 
notes 132–33 and accompanying text (discussing other legitimate concerns with subjecting 
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However, prior to Schweiker, the Supreme Court declined to estop 
the government in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, where an agent 
selling insurance for a government-owned enterprise mistakenly 
informed the Merrills that their reseeded wheat crop was covered under 
the insurance policy.79  When a drought destroyed the entire crop, the 
government enterprise denied the Merrills’ claim for the insurance 
proceeds.80  While the Court recognized that refusing to estop the 
government would result in hardship, it declined to do so and charged 
the Merrills with constructive notice of the regulations.81  In a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Jackson expressed his suggestion that the government be 
held to a certain level of honor and reliability in dealing with its 
citizens.82  Nevertheless, the Court held that the Federal Crop Insurance 
                                                                                                             
federal agencies to civil suits and the principal setbacks to holding the government liable 
for its unlawful actions). 
79 Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).  In Merrill, the Merrill Brothers 
purchased crop insurance from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (“FCIC”).  Id. at 
381–82.  The Merrill Brothers informed the Bonneville Agricultural Conservation 
Committee, acting as FCIC’s agent, that they were planting spring wheat and that they 
were reseeding on winter wheat coverage on all but sixty acres of the land.  Id. at 382.  The 
Committee notified respondents that the entire crop was insurable, and the FCIC accepted 
the application; however, the application itself did not disclose that any part of the insured 
crop was reseeded.  Id. 
80 See id. at 382 (noting that FCIC refused to pay the loss after learning that the destroyed 
acreage had been reseeded).  The Merrills attempted to insure the reseeded spring wheat; 
they believed that they had obtained insurance from the Government.  Id. at 385; see also 
Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations, 10 Fed. Reg. 1585, 1591 (Feb. 7, 1945) (“The term wheat 
crop shall not include . . . spring wheat which has been reseeded on winter wheat acreage 
in the 1945 crop year.”); 7 C.F.R § 418 (1986) (providing the current regulations regarding 
wheat crop insurance).  Interestingly, § 418.5 currently provides, in part, where a party 
believing that he was insured bases that belief on the misrepresentation of an agent of the 
FCIC and suffers a crop loss, he shall be paid as though he were otherwise entitled.  Id. 
§ 418.5. 
81 Merrill, 332 U.S. at 383–85.  “[T]he Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations were binding on 
all who sought to come within the Federal Crop Insurance Act, regardless of actual 
knowledge of what is in the Regulations or of the hardship resulting from innocent 
ignorance.”  Id. at 385. 
82 Id. at 387 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Specifically, Justice Jackson stated: 
In this case, the Government entered a field which required the 
issuance of large numbers of insurance policies to people engaged in 
agriculture.  It could not expect them to be lawyers, except in rare 
instances, and one should not be expected to have to employ a lawyer 
to see whether his own Government is issuing him a policy which in 
case of loss would turn out to be no policy at all.  There was no fraud 
or concealment, and those who represented the Government in taking 
on the risk apparently no more suspected the existence of a hidden 
regulation that would render the contract void than did the 
policyholder.  It is very well to say that those who deal with the 
Government should turn square corners.  But there is no reason why 
the square corners should constitute a one-way street. 
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Corporation (“FCIC”) was not bound by the unauthorized 
representation of its agent because the regulation expressly excluded 
reseeded wheat from insurance coverage.83 
The most controversial concept concerning government corruption 
entails holding the government liable as an “enterprise” under the RICO 
statute.84  Many defendants object to RICO’s application to corruption 
cases by citing the definition itself, the absence of explicit legislative 
history, and the assumed inapplicability of civil remedies to 
governmental entities; however, federal circuit courts addressing this 
issue have extended the term “enterprise” to governmental units.85  For 
instance, in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the Court avoided 
addressing remedies because—when considering comparable cases—it 
did not conclude that remedies appropriate to redress private parties 
would be equally appropriate for municipalities.86  On the other hand, in 
United States v. Thompson, the court held that the plain meaning of 
“enterprise” included governmental units and extended the term to 
“‘The Office of Governor’ of the State of Tennessee.”87 
                                                                                                             
The Government asks us to lift its policies out of the control of the 
States and to find or fashion a federal rule to govern them.  I should 
respond to that request by laying down a federal rule that would hold 
these agencies to the same fundamental principles of fair dealing that 
have been found essential in progressive states to prevent insurance 
from being an investment in disappointment. 
Id. at 387–88 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
83 See id. at 384–85 (stating that “[w]hatever the form in which the Government 
functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of 
having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within 
the bounds of his authority”). 
84 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006); see supra note 38 (offering the text of RICO and defining 
“enterprise”). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (“Even if one or more of the 
civil remedies might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would 
not serve to limit the enterprise concept.”); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1000 
(6th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (“It seems clear to us that those who played the leading roles in the 
enactment of the RICO statute thoroughly understood organized crime’s impact upon 
government entities.”); supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Congress’ intent to refrain from 
limiting the scope of RICO terms); see also infra notes 87 and 114 (providing federal circuit 
court cases that apply the term “enterprise” to governmental entities). 
86 435 U.S. 389, 402 (1978). 
87 685 F.2d 993, 994 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc).  Until Thompson, the courts of appeals were 
unanimous in holding that governmental units could be “enterprises.”  See id. at 994 
(rejecting appellants’ allegation that The Office of Governor of the State of Tennessee was 
an enterprise due to the breadth of RICO’s statutory language, RICO’s legislative history, 
and the unanimity of judicial precedent on this issue in other circuits).  But see United 
States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 33 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e view the language of § 1961(4), 
defining enterprise, as unambiguously encompassing governmental units, and we consider 
that the purpose and history of the Act and the substance of RICO’s provisions 
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Just as numerous cases have demonstrated that a government 
agency may be considered an enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 
perhaps plaintiffs in Rinke v. BP could also establish that MMS was an 
enterprise used to further BP’s scheme, which ultimately led to the oil 
catastrophe.88  Further, RICO’s jurisprudence, as well as the “ecological 
Armageddon” in the Gulf of Mexico, reveals the need for an avenue to 
hold corrupt government agencies—acting as enterprises—liable for 
their unlawful actions.89  To illustrate the need to control corruption 
among the federal government to a greater extent, it is critical to assess 
MMS’s history of participating in racketeering activity.90 
                                                                                                             
demonstrate a clear congressional intent that RICO be interpreted to apply to activities that 
corrupt public or governmental entities.”); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (rejecting United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976)).  
“Finding nothing to the contrary in either the legislative history or the statute, we hold that 
the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department is an ‘enterprise’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).”  Id.; 
United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the Philadelphia 
Traffic Court was an enterprise within the meaning of the RICO statute); United States v. 
Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1979) (concluding that a municipal police department 
was an enterprise when the Mayor of Madison, police officers, and operators of business 
establishments engaged in a pattern of securing monetary payments and sexual favors 
from city tavern operators in exchange for protection from illegal activities); United States 
v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089–92 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was an enterprise); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 
415–16 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the Macon, Georgia municipal police department 
constituted an enterprise within the meaning of the RICO statute); United States v. Ohlson, 
552 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977) (sub silentio) (holding that the State of California Bureau 
of Narcotic Enforcement and the Narcotic Bureau of the San Francisco Police Department 
was an enterprise conducting and participating in a racketeering scheme to assist various 
narcotics dealers in the manufacture and sale of narcotic and stimulant drugs). 
88 See Amended Complaint, supra note 8 (providing a background of the alleged events 
that ultimately led to the BP oil spill); infra Part II.C (describing the events leading up to the 
BP oil spill and the government agency’s history of participating in racketeering activity); 
see also supra note 87 (demonstrating how numerous cases have applied the term 
“enterprise” to governmental entities in corruption cases); infra note 114 (providing 
additional cases that have applied the term “enterprise” to governmental entities in 
corruption cases). 
89 See Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 6 (emphasizing that “[t]he Gulf of Mexico is 
in the midst of an ecological Armageddon that could literally destroy the marine and 
coastal environment and way of life for generations of Americans”); see also Global 
Corruption Barometer 2010, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2010), http://www. 
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010 (providing relevant statistics 
regarding the increase in corruption over the past three years, specifically noting that 
corruption affecting political parties, legislature/parliament, and police ranked the highest 
among public perception). 
90 See infra Part II.C (presenting how the MMS enterprise allegedly played a crucial role 
in one of the largest environmental and economic disasters in history). 
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C. Government Agency as Enterprise in BP Oil Spill 
On April 20, 2010, an offshore drilling rig explosion in the Gulf of 
Mexico resulted in the largest oil spill in history.91  This tragedy not only 
destroyed marine and wildlife habitats, but it also negatively affected 
economic output, jobs, and income along the coast.92  In an effort to 
secure the Deepwater Horizon exploration drilling permit, BP allegedly 
misrepresented the possible dangers of an oil spill in its Oil Spill 
Response Plan and greatly overstated its ability to control a spill if it 
occurred.93  Nonetheless, MMS approved these false documents on two 
separate occasions and provided BP with an unconditional exclusion 
from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).94  Under 
NEPA, MMS was required to produce an Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) assessing the prospective negative impact drilling 
could have on the environment, and exclusions were not to be given in 
cases where drilling operations took place in such deep water.95  The 
                                                 
91 See Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 6–7 (describing how the enormous, 
uncontrolled spill caused a vigorous “oil slick that . . . covered tens of thousands of square 
miles of ocean,” which made its way to land on the coasts of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 
and Louisiana). 
92 See id. ¶¶ 9–10 (specifically accentuating the billions of dollars in damage to 
businesses, property, and income of the people of Florida, including the closing of fishing 
waters throughout the region, and the loss of income to the tourism industry, hotels, 
resorts, and restaurant owners). 
93 See id. ¶¶ 44–45 (providing a detailed account of BP’s acts in furtherance of its 
fraudulent scheme via its Oil Spill Response Plan).  MMS personnel are responsible for 
meticulously reviewing each Response Plan to ensure the company is capable of 
responding to an emergency oil spill.  Id. ¶ 44.  MMS neglected its responsibilities by failing 
to ensure that BP was capable of containing a major oil spill.  Id.  But see Matthew 
Dickinson, Why the Minerals Management Service Should Not Be Blamed for the Oil Spill, BLOGS 
DOT MIDDLEBURY (May 31, 2010), http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2010/ 
05/31/why-the-minerals-management-service-should-not-be-blamed-for-the-oil-spill/ 
(blaming Congress for neglecting its responsibility to oversee MMS’s operations and 
providing a conflicting description of the Rinke allegations). 
94 Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 55; see also id. ¶¶ 48, 55 (noting BP’s  mistakes in 
its Oil Spill Response Plan, including references to sea lions, seals, and walruses, which are 
Arctic marine mammals that do not dwell in Gulf waters).  The Oil Spill Response Plan also 
referenced a professor—listed as a consultant for respondent—that died four years prior to 
its submission.  Id. ¶ 48.  Further, the document contained links to a Japanese home 
shopping website for one of BP’s Marine Spill Response Corp. (“MRSC”) main equipment 
providers in the region if rapid deployment resources were necessary to respond to a spill.  
Id. 
95 See id. ¶¶ 55–56 (presenting instances in which categorical EIS exclusions should not 
be given, as listed under NEPA and MMS internal policies, which include such instances 
where drilling “take[s] place in ‘relatively untested deep water,’ ‘areas of high biological 
sensitivity,’ [and] drilling operations ‘utilizing new or unusual technology’”).  Although BP 
had obtained an MMS permit for 20,211 feet, the drilling had actually been taking place at 
22,000 feet.  Id. ¶ 66. 
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largest oil spill in history occurred when the oil rig was in the final 
phases of drilling the exploratory well.96 
Subsequent to the massive uncontrolled oil spill, BP misrepresented 
the rate at which the oil was leaking to avoid further likelihood of 
damages liability.97  However, according to Rinke, the oil spill could have 
been avoided if the government had been doing its job correctly.98  
Investigative reports have found incidents where oil industry 
representatives unlawfully provided MMS agents with gifts, drugs, sex, 
and alcohol.99  The federal government is now facing a major 
predicament because MMS supposedly continues to have inappropriate 
relationships with oil companies, and the public is denied honest 
services and environmental safeguards as a consequence.100  MMS 
appears to have been more concerned with accommodating oil 
companies, including BP, than protecting the environment.101 
                                                 
96 See id. ¶ 67 (revisiting BP’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to stop the uncontrolled oil 
spill using untested technology after the ensuing spill occurred in the final phases of 
drilling). 
97 See id. ¶ 68 (reiterating that BP fraudulently low-balled its estimates to avoid the huge 
royalty payments it perhaps would incur from the oil spill).  To that end, BP “fraudulently, 
knowingly and willingly misrepresented the oil flow rate and concealed the far higher rate 
at which the uncontrolled oil spill ha[d] spewed into the Gulf of Mexico.”  Id. 
98 See id. ¶ 112 (providing numerous violations of MMS ethics rules).  The Inspector 
General presented reports revealing that oil industry representatives “‘purchased meals, 
drinks, and other items of entertainment’” for MMS employees, who viewed the oil 
companies as “‘partners’” or “‘customers.’”  Id.  Further, the representatives instructed 
MMS employees to keep quiet about attending the oil industry social events.  Id. ¶ 113.  For 
instance, an MMS supervisor requested employees to privately RSVP to an oil industry 
social event.  Id. 
99 See id. ¶ 114 (specifically emphasizing that a document concluded government 
personnel habitually consumed alcohol, used cocaine and marijuana, and had sexual 
relations with representatives at oil industry functions).  The gifts included golf and ski 
trips, snowboarding rental and lessons, golf and garment bags, silver trays, tickets to 
sporting events and music concerts, meals and drinks, invitations to holiday parties in 
various locations, hunting and fishing trips, and paintball outings.  Id. ¶ 116.  BP has also 
vetoed MMS attempts to employ safety rules and regulations that would require a 
substantial amount of money to comply.  Id. ¶ 119.  Further, MMS professedly ignored 
findings of BP’s spill risks, bypassed endangered species permits, and sometimes had 
reports changed completely to show no environmental risks at all.  Id. 
100 See id. ¶ 122 (asserting that MMS government employees have been more interested in 
accommodating the oil companies, rather than providing American citizens with honest 
services in their public and environmental safeguarding responsibilities).  Moreover, they 
have “rubber stamped and looked the other way [regarding] serious safety” information; 
instead protecting the greed of oil companies—including BP—in order to increase profits.  
Id. 
101 See id. ¶ 126 (showing the federal agency’s alleged regulatory regime that permitted 
response plans with false oil spill response assurances by the oil companies for possible 
accidental spills).  Although MMS may have known that such an epic catastrophe—the 
Deepwater Horizon spill—could have occurred as early as the year 2000, they failed to 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Private parties have struggled in their attempts to hold the federal 
government liable for RICO violations, just as courts have struggled to 
fully uncover Congress’ intentions—mainly in defining its appropriate 
scope—when creating the statute.  Part III of this Note discusses the 
various reasons why courts have struggled to hold the government liable 
for its wrongful actions, and the public policies that support the notion 
of creating an avenue to extend RICO liability to the federal 
government.102  Part III.A specifically analyzes the positive and negative 
aspects of the different approaches courts have taken when considering 
the conflicting language of the statute and its legislative history.103  Part 
III.B evaluates the shortcomings of the various methods courts have 
employed to combat political corruption at the federal level, and why 
they are particularly insufficient to remedy the injustice suffered by 
victims of governmental RICO violations.104  Part III.C further examines 
why sovereign immunity prevents civil suits against the federal 
government, and the policy reasons that support waiving this defense 
for RICO claims.105  Ultimately, Part III concludes that the existing laws 
designed to fight government corruption fail to adequately address this 
phenomenon at its highest level, while leaving open possible solutions to 
remedy those negatively impacted by the unethical actions of 
government officials.106 
A. Courts’ Interpretation of RICO’s Conflicting Language 
If RICO cannot be used as an avenue to prosecute federal corruption, 
how do courts construe the statute’s designed purpose?  And, could the 
                                                                                                             
enact any additional safety measures.  Id.; see infra Part III (discussing the possible impact 
of allowing enterprises, such as MMS, to continue avoiding liability for its RICO 
violations). 
102 See infra Part III (providing various reasons why the courts have struggled to hold the 
government liable for its wrongful actions and public policies that encourage creating an 
avenue to extend RICO liability to the federal government). 
103 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the positive and negative aspects of the different 
approaches courts have taken when considering the conflicting language of the statute and 
its legislative history). 
104 See infra Part III.B (evaluating the shortcomings of the various avenues courts have 
employed to combat political corruption at the federal level, and particularly why they are 
not sufficient to remedy the injustice suffered by victims of government RICO violations). 
105 See infra Part III.C (examining why sovereign immunity prevents civil suits against the 
federal government and the policy reasons that support waiving this defense for RICO 
claims). 
106 See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to adequately address government corruption 
at the federal level). 
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government possibly be considered a “person” for purposes of RICO 
violations?  Although § 1961(3) defines the controversial term “person,” 
courts in several states have struggled with who this definition was 
intended to address.107  In the civil context, personhood in federal law 
emerges from tort law’s competing interests in increasing a tort victim’s 
chances of compensation, while limiting its scope to only those parties 
with the necessary quantum of responsibility.108  While a government 
agency has never been liable for RICO violations as a “person” under the 
statute, the Supreme Court has extended the term to include 
municipalities in cases imposing civil liability for conduct also 
punishable by criminal sanctions, which the RICO statutes also permit.109  
As evident in federal jurisprudence, the courts’ propensity to make 
decisions when considering competing outlooks of statutory 
                                                 
107 Compare United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941) (finding that, because 
it was “hardly credible” that Congress meant the term “person” to have different meanings 
within the same sentence of the Clayton Act’s treble damages action, Congress could not 
have intended to include the federal government in the term “person”), with United States 
v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 879 F.2d 20, 23, 30 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the federal government was not a “person” with standing to seek treble 
damages under RICO, and that the alleged organized crime family was not a “person” 
subject to suit), Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1942) (holding that a state is a 
“person” for purposes of bringing Sherman Act claims and rejecting the argument that, 
because states were immune from such suits under the sovereign immunity doctrine, 
Cooper Corp. dictated a contrary result), and Cnty. of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 784 F. Supp. 
1275, 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (extending the term “person” to include a municipal 
corporation under RICO because of its ability to hold legal or beneficial property in 
Michigan). 
108 Compare W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, 5–6 
(5th ed. 1984) (“[Tort law is that] body of law whch [sic] is directed toward the 
compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered 
within the scope of their legally recognized interests generally, rather than one interest 
only, where the law considers that compensation is required.”), with id. § 2, at 9–15 
(recognizing that certain features of the law of torts exist to punish the defendant).  The 
Court in Phile further rationalizes this notion, stating: 
The law never punishes any man criminally but for his own act, yet it 
frequently punishes him in his pocket, for the act of another.  Thus, if a 
wife commits an offence [sic], the husband is not liable to the penalties; 
but if she obtains the property of another by any means not felonious, 
he must make the payment and amends. 
Phile v. The Ship Anna, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 197, 207 (Pa. 1787). 
109 See Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has construed the term “person” to encompass a broad enough definition 
to include a municipality); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) 
(holding that local governments are not immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); City of 
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978) (“Since the Court has held that 
the definition of ‘person’ or ‘persons’ embraces both cities and States, it is understandable 
that the cities do not argue that they are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of the antitrust 
laws.”). 
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interpretation eradicates Congress’ power to make fundamental policy 
decisions; this has led to inconsistency and unpredictability of the 
concept of legal personhood under federal law.110 
To that end, the possible application of a civil RICO claim against a 
government agency in the class action suit against BP should not be 
surprising, as MMS may be considered an “enterprise” when “liberally 
constru[ing]” the ambiguous language of the statute “to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.”111  Moreover, applying RICO to the alleged facts in 
Rinke is consistent with RICO’s express statement of findings and 
purpose.112  When analyzing the statute on its face, nothing implies 
                                                 
110 See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180–85 (1994) 
(rejecting the argument that civil aiding and abetting is such a generally accepted notion of 
tort law that Congress presumes it will apply when drafting legislation); id. at 177 (“[T]he 
text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation. . . .  
[W]e think that conclusion resolves the case.”). 
111 See The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 
922, 947 (“The provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.”).  While some judges have doubted the idea of applying the liberal construction 
clause in criminal prosecutions, no objection has been expressed to applying it in the civil 
context.  Compare United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., 
dissenting) (“It is unclear whether Congress intended its directive to apply to those sections 
which establish criminal liability or merely to the ‘remedial’ provisions of Title IX.”), 
United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1070 (3d Cir. 1978) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“I detect 
nothing [in the liberal construction clause] that precludes the application of the rule of 
narrow construction of penal statutes.”), United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. 
Md. 1976) (“Congress may instruct courts to give broad interpretations to civil provisions, 
[but] it cannot require courts to abandon the traditional canon of interpretation that 
ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of leniency.”), and Craig M. 
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts:  An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 860 
n.126 (1980) (“Presumably, . . . the congressional statement is only applicable to the 
remedial civil portions of the statute . . . .”), with United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 
997–98 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (extending enterprise to The Office of the Governor of 
Tennessee when conspiring to solicit and accept bribes for influencing the granting of 
pardons and paroles to those previously convicted of or charged with a crime), and United 
States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1981) (extending enterprise to the 
Madison County Sheriff’s Office, who engaged in a scheme to extort payoffs for 
prostitution and towing companies within Madison County, Illinois). 
112 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922–23 states: 
Statement of Findings and Purpose 
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States 
is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that 
annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by 
unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) 
organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money 
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan 
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and 
distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms 
of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used 
to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to 
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Congress’ intent to limit its coverage to only those who have engaged in 
racketeering activity, but the language suggests an intention to 
incorporate those who have affected interstate commerce with their 
unlawful conduct.113 
Also, extending the term “enterprise” to a government agency has 
garnered a profuse amount of debate in political corruption cases; 
defendants often object to its application in RICO claims by citing the 
definition itself, the legislative history, congressional policy, and various 
rules of construction.114  However, a government agency could qualify as 
                                                                                                             
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime 
activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s 
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing 
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden 
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and 
undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) 
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-
gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally 
admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or 
remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to 
the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. 
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized 
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the 
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, 
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with 
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. 
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. at 922–23. 
113 United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978); see also The Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, § 904(a) (noting that Congress acknowledged that organized crime 
effectively drains billions of dollars annually from the nation’s economy, weakens the 
stability of the economic system, and heavily burdens interstate and foreign commerce); 
supra note 112 and accompanying text (analyzing Congress’ intentions when creating The 
Organized Crime Control Act and emphasizing the negative impact organized crime has 
on the nation’s economy and interstate commerce).  Courts have used various methods to 
establish the requisite nexus with interstate commerce, which falls within the jurisdiction of 
RICO.  See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 379 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding a group 
associated for the purpose of committing arson that used mail to obtain insurance proceeds 
by fraud guilty of conspiring to participate in the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate 
commerce); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 8 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding a sufficient 
basis for RICO jurisdiction when a prosecutor’s office purchased and used supplies outside 
of their state of residence). 
114 See Thompson, 685 F.2d at 997–98 (extending enterprise to the Office of the Governor of 
Tennessee when conspiring to solicit and accept bribes for influencing the granting of 
pardons and paroles to those previously convicted of or charged with a crime); United 
States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that New York City Civil Court 
was an “enterprise” within the meaning of RICO); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 
450 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding the Philadelphia Traffic Court to be an “enterprise” under 
RICO).  Contra Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1022 (holding that a state is not an enterprise within 
the meaning of RICO). 
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a “‘legal entity’” described in the first clause because a government 
agency is an entity, and it is, by definition, legal.115  Permitting 
government agencies to be “enterprises” via these theories does not 
strain the statute; moreover, neither reading would cause internal 
contradictions within RICO.116  Additionally, restricting RICO to non-
government cases would misinterpret the legislative history and 
congressional policy expressed in the Organized Crime Control Act.117  
Precluding the application of RICO to government agencies not only 
subverts congressional policy by limiting its coverage to exclude other 
problems it was designed to remedy, but also disregards Congress’ 
concern for the feasibility of all levels of government in the face of a 
continuous and well-financed attack by organized crime.118 
Taken as a whole, the legislative history of the Organized Crime 
Control Act, particularly Title IX, establishes that Congress did not 
intend to limit the scope of RICO.119  Furthermore, direct victims and 
competing organizations of racketeering activity were the intended 
beneficiaries for civil injunctions, damages, and other relief.120  While 
attempting to prevent organized crime and corruption among 
government and legitimate businesses, Congress knew that it was 
enacting vital federal criminal and civil remedies in an area customarily 
regulated by common law fraud.121  As evident in the text and legislative 
history, government corruption conceivably motivated Congress to enact 
RICO; therefore, to properly apply RICO, the courts must consider the 
government’s interest in preventing its criminal activity when 
                                                 
115 See Angelilli, 660 F.2d at 31 (defining “entity” broadly).  Further, a government agency 
or those corrupted within it could be classified as a “group of individuals associated in 
fact” under the second clause of the statute.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). 
116 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s view that “absurd 
results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with”). 
117 See supra note 51 (noting Senator McClellan’s statements addressing the subversion of 
democratic processes).  Senator Murphy also expressed his concern that “[o]rganized crime 
flourishes only where it has corrupted local officials.”  116 CONG. REC. 962 (1970). 
118 116 CONG. REC. 962; see id. at 35, 199–200 (highlighting the estimated $2 billion paid 
out each year by organized crime to public officials in and out of the criminal justice system 
to buy immunity from the law as one of the most disturbing statistics revealed by the 
President’s Crime Commission). 
119 See TYLER, supra note 48, at 181 (reiterating that racketeering has never been a term 
limited to organized crime in the mob sense).  Also, Congress carefully drafted RICO 
outside of the antitrust statutes to avoid the limiting concepts of “competitive” and 
“commercial” injuries.  Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 5, at 1035. 
120 See 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (recapping Senator Hruska’s speech on the importance 
of Title IX (now RICO), stating that its “principal value . . . may well be found to exist in its 
civil provisions”). 
121 See supra Part II.A.2 (providing an overview of RICO’s legislative history and 
examining Congress’ intentions). 
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determining whether Congress’ broadly-intended scope should extend 
to a government body that acts as an enterprise.122 
B. Fighting Corruption at the Federal Level 
The federal government combats political corruption mostly through 
criminal statutes, professional and ethical regulations, and impeachment; 
however, these basic mechanisms do not adequately compensate for the 
injustice suffered by victims of government RICO violations.123  
Accordingly, Part III.B.1 discusses why these current attempts fail to 
sufficiently regulate federal corruption.124  Further, Part III.B.2 evaluates 
the potential effects of neglecting to create a solution to this predicament, 
indicating the need for a legitimate avenue designed precisely to prevent 
government corruption.125  Ultimately, Part III.B concludes that the 
current approaches to contest political corruption do not effectively 
prevent or remedy government RICO violations, which is perhaps the 
most severe form of government corruption because of its predisposition 
to result in economic disasters.  Furthermore, the failure to correct this 
problem could lead to nation-wide turmoil.126 
1. Avenues Available to Fight Corruption 
Although Congress has not enacted laws for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting official corruption, 18 U.S.C. § 201, among other statutes, has 
been interpreted as providing a means to do so; it is the primary criminal 
                                                 
122 See supra Part III.A (expressing Congress’ intent to prevent government corruption, 
among other concerns, when enacting RICO); infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the 
RICO statute that directly addresses government liability when it serves as an enterprise to 
further a pattern of racketeering activity); see also supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text 
(noting that the general rule of statutory construction must “defer to a discernible 
legislative judgment”). 
123 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) 
(prosecuting federal officials for both the offer and receipt of bribes and illegal gratuities); 5 
U.S.C. app. §§ 101–111 (1999) (providing the Ethics in Government Act, which created a 
framework requiring extensive financial disclosure if the gifts from one source have an 
aggregate value of more than $250 in one year). 
124 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing why the current attempts to combat unethical 
behavior by government officials and employees fail to adequately regulate federal 
political corruption). 
125 See infra Part III.B.2 (assessing the potential effects of failing to create a solution to this 
predicament). 
126 See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to adequately address government corruption 
at the federal level by holding the government liable for its RICO violations). 
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provision currently buckling down on federal political corruption.127  
Bribery scholar Daniel Lowenstein has described political corruption as a 
series of concentric circles with the most severe form—bribery—at the 
“black core” surrounded by grey circles “growing progressively lighter 
as they become more distant from the center . . . .”128  Because § 201 
proscribes all forms of corruption, one must completely distinguish the 
unlawful behavior from any legal activity.129  However, this is an 
extremely difficult task, and further problems stem from the lack of 
consensus as to what constitutes bribery or corruption, which, in turn, 
leads to confusion and inconsistency in application.130  All the more 
problematic is the notion that bribery—the most severe form of 
corruption—is devoid of a clearly defined scope of prohibited conduct in 
the statute; nonetheless, officials are engaging in these unlawful activities 
without suffering the consequences of their unlawful actions.131 
How can the central criminal provision dealing with the most 
extreme form of federal political corruption be so defective?  And, who is 
supervising the government officials who prosecute those in violation of 
the statute?  These are a couple of the principal setbacks to holding the 
government liable for its unlawful actions, as selectivity in 
investigations—putting aside minor acts of corruption that often turn 
out to be quite important and perhaps just as harmful to the well-being 
of the country—contributes to the long list of officials left unprosecuted 
for violations.132  Additionally, a variety of statutes and regulations 
                                                 
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (prosecuting federal officials for both offering and receiving bribes 
or illegal gratuities); supra note 27 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 
U.S. 398, 399 (1999)); see also Beale, supra, note 27, at 701 (suggesting that § 201 is the most 
important criminal provision dealing with federal political corruption); supra note 27 and 
accompanying text (discussing the use of 18 U.S.C. § 201 to prosecute official corruption). 
128 Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA 
L. REV. 784, 786 (1985).  He also views the crime very narrowly, as a precise quid pro quo to 
perform or not perform an official duty in return for a personal benefit.  Id. at 786–87. 
129 See Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery:  
Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1620 (1992) 
(describing the issues with bribery laws regarding political corruption). 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 78–79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (describing the 
difficulties in distinguishing between bribes, gratuities, and legitimate campaign 
contributions under the federal bribery statute). 
131 See Whitaker, supra note 129, at 1622 (evidencing the difficulties in distinguishing 
between the levels of bribery that society aspires to prosecute and the problems with 
establishing certain provisions of the statute, i.e., the characterization of an improper 
payment, which depends on the intent of the payor and recipient, and the availability of 
evidence indicating the effect of the payment). 
132 See Bertrand de Speville, Empowering Anti-Corruption Agencies:  Defying Institutional 
Failure and Strengthening Preventive and Repressive Capacities, ISCTE, 5 (May 1416, 2008), 
http://ancorage-net.org/content/documents/de_speville.pdf (suggesting that selectivity 
in investigations contributes to loss of public confidence in an anti-corruption agency).  The 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss1/6
2011] Combating Government Corruption 199 
impose ethical and professional restrictions upon federal officers and 
employees; yet, considering the constitutional impeachment process 
along with the other avenues available to prosecute federal corruption, 
they do not sufficiently cover all possible forms of official misconduct or 
misuse of office.133 
Generally, the current laws available to prosecute federal corruption 
are inadequate as a result of being overly complicated and unintelligible, 
or lacking in some basic offenses.134  For example, § 201 only applies to 
public officials, while excluding the private sector; further problems arise 
when the unauthorized gifts received by a public official cannot be 
proven to be an inducement or reward.135  As evidenced by the 
deficiency of the primary tool used to fight federal political corruption—
18 U.S.C. § 201—and the reoccurring theme of corruption disrupting the 
integrity of the federal government, the current laws are ineffective; 
however, RICO violations often exist in juxtaposition to violations of the 
laws currently used, perhaps providing an alternative avenue to combat 
                                                                                                             
failure to investigate some acts of corruption proclaims to all that corruption is of minor 
importance, and that “double standards apply”; thus, society and government officials 
themselves are under the impression that their corruptive acts are acceptable.  Id.  For 
example, commissioners have a duty to supervise the activities of IRS employees, and, after 
investing IRS resources, the Church Committee found that they had “contributed to an 
atmosphere in which excesses were possible by ignoring clear indications of excesses and 
failing to take corrective measures when confronted with improper behavior.”  Intelligence 
Activities and the Rights of Americans:  Final Rep. of the Senate Select Comm. on 
Intelligence Activities, S. REP. NO. 94-775 (1976), available at http://www.icdc.com/ 
~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIcg.htm. 
133 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–111 
(1999) (providing a framework created by the Ethics in Government Act, which requires 
extensive financial disclosure, including the source and value of all gifts received from a 
source if the gifts have an aggregate value of more than $250 in one year); 5 C.F.R. 
§§ 2635.201–2635.204 (2011) (presenting the ethical rules promulgated for officers and 
employees of the executive branch); see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 
U.S. 398, 407–08 (1999) (suggesting that the federal ethics rules and regulations may give 
rise to a narrow interpretation of criminal statutes, further restricting the range of unlawful 
behavior covered, and thus permitting officials to escape liability for violations of the 
statutes); Beale, supra note 27, at 702–04 (discussing Title 18 of the United States Code, § 201 
and the variety of statutes and regulations designed to prevent federal political corruption). 
134 See generally Speville, supra note 132 (providing a list of reasons why the current fight 
against corruption fails, including inadequate laws, fear of the pain caused by effective 
enforcement, lack of resources available, and weak political will). 
135 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A)(2006) (noting that the public official—the recipient of the 
bribe—does not violate the federal bribery statute until he is actually influenced, because 
the statute proscribes the receipt of payment in return for “being influenced in the 
performance of any official act”). 
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corruption.136  Equally problematic is the lack of available laws designed 
to compensate private parties for their losses occurring as a result of the 
government’s corruptive acts, such as those victims suffering from 
injuries to businesses and property allegedly as a result of the MMS 
Enterprise and BP’s continuous pattern of racketeering activity.137  
Finally, it appears as though Congress has intentionally omitted laws 
providing remedies to private parties; failing to address this issue could 
lead to a nation drowning in corruption.138 
2. Nation in Turmoil 
Why should Congress subject the federal government to liability for 
its participation in racketeering activity?139  And, what will happen if 
Congress continuously overlooks the issue?  To date, government 
corruption is so prevalent that those federal officials or agencies involved 
in dishonest activities overlook the severe effects that result from such 
activity, justifying it merely as a way of “‘doing business.’”140  Although 
corrupt officials and private contractors may benefit financially from 
                                                 
136 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (providing the pertinent definitions required to establish a RICO 
violation and a list of acts considered “racketeering activity” that may be used to establish a 
“pattern of racketeering activity”); United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1417–18 (7th Cir. 
1987) (considering a state “official misconduct statute” as a RICO predicate bribery 
offense); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that the 
defendant’s conduct violated many statutes falling within the description of bribery, so the 
acts fell within the general category of the predicate offenses necessary to establish a RICO 
violation); see also supra Part III.B.1 (evidencing the inadequacy of 18 U.S.C. § 201 and other 
tools available to prosecute federal political corruption); infra Part IV (proposing a solution 
to adequately address government corruption at the federal level by holding the 
government liable for its RICO violations); cf. United States v. Perkins, 596 F. Supp. 528, 531 
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (qualifying the federal gratuities provision as a RICO predicate offense). 
137 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the shortcomings of the current laws designed to 
prevent federal corruption); supra Part II.C (describing the events leading up to the BP oil 
spill and Rinke’s report of MMS’s history of participating in racketeering activity); supra 
Part III.B.1 (presenting the tools available to fight corruption, which only apply to 
government officials, indicating the absence of remedies available to private parties). 
138 See infra Part III.B.2 (assessing the negative impact government corruption has on the 
United States and the potential effects of failing to create a solution to this predicament); 
infra Part III.C (examining why sovereign immunity prevents civil suits against the federal 
government, evidencing Congress’ intent to omit laws that provide avenues for private 
relief from the government). 
139 In other words, what interest does the government have in permitting suits against 
itself? 
140 See e.g., Garner, 837 F.2d at 1408 (stating that contractors who paid tips to sewer 
inspectors claimed it was simply a “‘cost of doing business’ in Chicago”); SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:  CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 27 
(1999) (reiterating that corrupt payments to secure major contracts and concessions 
generally preserve large businesses and federal officials); see supra note 17 and 
accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of corruption). 
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their unlawful schemes, they are depriving the government budget of 
adequate returns from its concessions.141  Furthermore, as tax collectors 
and customs agents control access to the outside world—which firms 
value—businesses and individuals often conspire with them to decrease 
the sums collected and expedite services.142  As a result, the taxpayers 
and corrupt officials split the savings in taxes and duties, but the lower-
class, the less well-connected taxpayers, and the general public 
essentially endure the costs as reduced services.143 
In addition to the detrimental effects the economy suffers as a result 
of the government’s deceitful activity, the public interest concern, 
coupled with the need for government credibility, is essential to the 
proper functioning of a democratic nation.144  The public must receive 
honest information about its government’s actions, and if the actors are 
not held accountable for illegal actions, then they are more likely to 
continue this behavior, effectively undermining the government’s 
credibility.145  Moreover, fairness is crucial to the practice of good 
                                                 
141 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 140, at 31 (relaying how officials extract corrupt gains 
from government concessions and highlighting the likelihood that those officials support 
an inefficient time path of costs and social benefits). 
142 See id. at 19 (describing an analogous scenario in which New York City workers 
reduced or eliminated tax liability for hundreds of property owners and collected bribes 
equal to ten percent of the tax liability they eliminated, sometimes even rising to twenty or 
thirty percent). 
143 See id. at 20 (“A corrupt tax and customs system that favors some groups and 
individuals over others can destroy efforts to put a country on a sound fiscal basis and 
discredit reform.”).  While the IRS is a law enforcement agency, it participates in many 
questionable activities; however, the commissioner’s insane preoccupation with public 
image, rather than legality concerns, has led to frequent efforts to avoid learning about 
wrongful conduct by its employees.  See Moloney v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 737, 741 
(N.D. Ohio 1974) (noting that the public relations men present the IRS as a kindly and 
benevolent organization, which always bends over backwards to ensure that it does not do 
anything outside of helping taxpayers be certain that they do not pay a penny more than 
what the Government is entitled to, and quite perversely, these proclamations have little 
relation to the patent realities among this great bureaucracy). 
144 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964) (indicating that the 
foundation of democracy and good government is an informed public).  Further, James 
Madison has expressed his belief that the public opinion sets boundaries for the 
government, and that it is the “‘real sovereign in every free one.’”  See Larry D. Kramer, 
“The Interest of the Man”:  James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of 
Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 717 (2006) (quoting Madison and describing 
his views on the importance of public opinion for democratic government). 
145 See Michael A. Haskel & Warren Haskel, Truth, Justice, and a Healthy Fear of Deceiving 
the Public:  An Argument for Imposing Constitutional Tort Liability for Fraudulent 
Misrepresentations by Executive Branch Officers, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 491, 517 (2010) 
(stressing the need for government credibility as one of the key reasons to deny 
government officials immunity from constitutional tort cases); Sam Roberts, Ideas & Trends:  
Keeping the Faith; in Government We Trust (As Far as We Can Throw it), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 
2004, § 4, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/weekinreview/ideas-
Lipinski: Combating Government Corruption: Suing the Federal Government Via
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
202 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
government, while a lack of integrity and the ability to avoid facing the 
claims of injured individuals are strong indicators of a bad 
government.146  The Bill of Rights is founded upon the guarantee that the 
government will honor individual rights despite the pragmatism of 
doing otherwise, and its purpose is “to provide protection from 
government acts that [have] oppressed private individuals . . . .”147  In 
spite of the chilling effect that would flow from imposing liability upon 
government actors, the judiciary must defer to the government’s interest 
in protecting individual rights, as this effect is critical to restore justice 
and the public’s faith in the credibility of its government actors.148  
                                                                                                             
trends-keeping-the-faith-in-government-we-trust-as-far-as-we-can-throw-it.html?page 
wanted=print&src=pm (emphasizing that public faith in government has declined since 
the Watergate scandal). 
146 See JOHN B. DILLON, NOTES ON HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN REFERENCE TO ADVERSE 
THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 84 (1871) (quoting Alexander Hamilton at the Constitutional Convention, stating 
that “every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of 
government”). 
147 Haskel & Haskel, supra note 145, at 518.  Nothing in the Bill of Rights refers to 
elevating society’s needs above individual rights or determining whether corruptive 
actions can be justified on the basis of protecting economic interests.  Id.  Although there is 
no express constitutional right to private civil remedies, affording individual relief for 
those suffering injury as a result of the government’s unlawful conduct, “[c]onstitutional 
rights are not determined by whether the government abuse can be justified on the basis of 
economic, political, or social concerns.”  Id.  Perhaps this right is derived from other federal 
statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act, which provides that “[e]very person who, 
under . . . any statute . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 
(1986) (“[T]he Bill of Rights is expressly designed to protect the individual against the 
aggregated and sometimes intolerant powers of the state . . . .”); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in 
the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities . . . .”); see also Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978) (“[T]he Civil Rights Act was 
intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official 
violation of federally protected rights.”). 
148 See James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 393, 409–10 (2003) (suggesting that the Civil War “gradually led the federal 
courts to play a more direct role in protecting individual rights”);  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97 
(giving private individuals standing to sue officers and agents of the federal government 
for constitutional violations despite the fact that the Civil Rights Act did not explicitly 
cover the Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents).  Notwithstanding the fact that no current 
law provides individuals with an avenue for private relief, the Supreme Court has given 
private individuals standing to sue federal officers and agents for constitutional violations; 
likewise, federal RICO violations are equally detrimental, and those violating the Act 
should be subject to similar consequences.  Id.  Imposing liability among individual 
government actors for RICO violations would effectively “over-deter government at the 
expense of constitutional innovation.”  Haskel & Haskel, supra note 145, at 491 n.3; see also 
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Ultimately, if this country continues to tolerate corruption at its highest 
level of government, it will facilitate a downward spiral where the 
malfeasance of some officials encourages others to participate in 
corruptive activity over the course of time.149 
C. Sovereign Immunity 
Although the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity generally 
bars suits against the federal government without its consent, Congress 
has authorized exceptions for those claims that meet the high threshold 
for obtaining a waiver of sovereign immunity.150  While the federal 
courts are generally inclined to construe the statutes waiving immunity 
in favor of the government, they have employed more liberal approaches 
to comply with the movement toward broadening the scope of the 
defense waiver.151  Indeed, Congress has responded to this trend by 
                                                                                                             
id. at 522 (concluding that strict liability damages for constitutional tort violations would 
have similar effects); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT:  CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR 
OFFICIAL WRONGS 98 (1983) (arguing that the current system, where individual officials are 
liable for damages rather than government entities, is flawed).  Peter H. Shuck, graduate of 
Harvard Law School and current professor at Yale Law School, has expressed his discord 
with imposing liability strictly on government officials.  Id.  To that end, damage awards 
against individual officials may chill vital decision-making by lower-level officials.  Id. 
149 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 140, at 26 (presenting some of the systematic costs 
associated with tolerating corruption). 
150 For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is a limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity for tort actions against the government.  See 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL. 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3658 (3d ed., 1998) (stating that the purpose of the 
FTCA is to provide certain claimants with a remedy against the government when 
previously it had been precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity).  Perhaps the 
right to private relief from the government for RICO violations is similar to the limited 
waiver for tort actions against the government in the sense that it is a civil action against 
the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property as a result of the 
government’s wrongful actions, under circumstances in which the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable; further, RICO violations could be construed as occurring 
within the scope of employment, which is required under the FTCA.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b) (creating an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine by giving the federal 
courts subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States for money 
damages).  However, subjecting the federal government to suit for civil RICO violations is 
more rational than the limited waiver, FTCA, as the statute requires a pattern of 
racketeering activity; thus, the government actors are undermining the integrity of the 
government on more than one occasion, providing reasonable grounds for a harsher 
punishment.  See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to adequately address civil RICO 
violations by the federal government, which would provide an alternative avenue to fight 
corruption at its highest level); infra Part III.C (presenting the policy reasons that support 
waiving this defense for RICO claims); supra note 68 and accompanying text (defining 
sovereign immunity). 
151 See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951) (noting the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to employ the strict construction rule because of its unwillingness to add to 
the severity of sovereign immunity); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940) 
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taking steps to eliminate many of the injustices suffered following the 
recognition of the sovereign immunity doctrine.152  After abolishing large 
portions of the formerly omnipotent sovereign immunity doctrine—by 
creating exceptions to the express waiver requirement—there has never 
been an attempt to restore any part of it; accordingly, permitting this 
defense to bar suits against the federal government for engaging in 
unlawful behavior that infringes on an individual’s rights resurrects 
those once disfavored injustices created by the defense for which 
exceptions were made.153 
Several policy justifications support waiving the doctrine when 
considering suits against the government for violating the civil RICO 
statute.154  Most importantly, “it is inconsistent for a democratic 
government to be exempt from responsibility for injuring its citizens.”155  
Likewise, the sovereign immunity doctrine is “archaic, outdated, and 
contributes nothing of value to the administration of justice in the 
                                                                                                             
(recognizing the harsh results and injustice produced by allowing the federal government 
to avoid liability through the sovereign immunity defense, stressing that the “prerogatives 
of the government yield to the needs of the citizen”). 
152 See Douglas Kahle, Note, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.:  “Unequivocal,” Yet 
Unwarranted, Support for Sovereign Immunity, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 325, 328 n.24 (1994) 
(presenting:  (1) the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976); (2) the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) (1976); and (3) the Court of Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) as 
the main congressional statutory enactments waiving the federal government’s immunity 
defense).  To that end, the recent expansive interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment 
have limited Congress’ ability to authorize private enforcement of federal environmental 
legislation—such as hazardous waste cleanups—against state governments.  Id.; see also 
MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 315, 319, 320 (Or. 2006) (rejecting 
attacks on a statute concerning public health and safety, holding that the regulation of land 
use did not compel unconstitutional limitations on the government’s plenary power, and 
stating that it was not an impermissible waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity). 
153 See James Samuel Sable, Comment, Sovereign Immunity:  A Battleground of Competing 
Considerations, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 457, 462 (1981) (“There has been no effort to overturn or 
rescind any of these ‘consents’ to suit against the sovereign.”); see also supra note 150 and 
accompanying text (referring to the portions eliminated from the sovereign immunity 
doctrine as a result of the major congressional statutory enactments). 
154 See Kahle, supra note 152, at 328 (providing the policy justifications that support 
waiving the sovereign immunity doctrine).  But see, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 
U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“[T]he logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as 
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”). 
155 Lisa Naparstek Green, Note, Limitations Periods Under Title VII:  Has Time Run Out on 
the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine?, 63 B.U. L. REV. 1157, 1175 (1983); see United States v. 
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940) (“A sense of justice has brought a progressive relaxation by 
legislative enactments of the rigor of the immunity rule.  As representative governments 
attempt to ameliorate inequalities as necessities will permit, prerogatives of the 
government yield to the needs of the citizen.”).  But see supra note 19 (providing examples 
of case law where courts have declined to apply RICO claims to the federal government). 
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courts.”156  In due course, the legal system became more advanced and 
the substantial injustices that occurred as a result of the doctrine’s 
application began to accrue; therefore, those arguments supporting the 
sovereign immunity defense were scrupulously discredited.157  Taken as 
a whole, considering the existing laws designed to fight government 
corruption at its highest level, the lack of available relief for private 
parties suffering injury as a result of the government’s participation in 
racketeering activity, and the trend to stray away from the sovereign 
immunity defense, Congress should amend the current civil RICO 
statute to create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions 
against the government.158 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
RICO’s ambiguous language and inconsistent application have 
allowed various unprincipled governmental entities to escape liability 
for participating in racketeering activity.159  The sovereign immunity 
doctrine, in concurrence with the deficiency of current laws available to 
prosecute government officials for illegal behavior, has encouraged 
society to view a corrupt government as the norm.160  While private 
parties may recover from individual government actors, the negative 
aspects of the current system considerably outweigh its advantages.161  
Also, the alternative methods of holding the government and its agents 
accountable for unlawful behavior fail, as government corruption 
                                                 
156 See Kahle, supra note 152, at 328 (providing further policy considerations supporting 
and opposing the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
157 See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the sovereign immunity doctrine’s “original reliance on the notion that a 
divinely ordained monarch ‘can do no wrong’ is, of course, thoroughly discredited”); see 
also Sable, supra note 153, at 467 (“The concerns expressed by those fearful of the abolition 
of sovereign immunity . . . can be readily dispelled.”). 
158 See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to adequately address corruption at its highest 
level by subjecting the United States to civil suits for RICO violations). 
159 See supra Part II.A.1 (examining the controversial language in the text); supra Part II.B 
(discussing the jurisprudence under RICO); supra Part III.A (analyzing the different 
approaches courts have taken when considering the conflicting language of the statute and 
its legislative history). 
160 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing why the current attempts to combat government 
officials’ unethical behavior fail to adequately regulate federal political corruption); supra 
Part III.C (presenting the policy reasons supporting and opposing the sovereign immunity 
doctrine); supra notes 68–83 (discussing the application of the sovereign immunity and 
equitable estoppel doctrines). 
161 See supra note 148 and accompanying text (presenting the disadvantages of permitting 
damage actions strictly against individual government actors, rather than government 
entities). 
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continues to grow.162  This section proposes a solution that takes into 
account the various flaws of the current paradigm.163  Part IV.A proposes 
an amendment to the civil RICO statute, and discusses why it would 
provide the superior method for seeking private relief from 
governmental entities.164  Next, Part IV.B discusses how the proposed 
amendment would affect the outcome of Rinke.165 
A. Proposed Amendment to Civil RICO 
To address government liability for RICO violations, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964(c) should be amended to provide an exception to the sovereign 
immunity doctrine.  The amended statute appears as follows: 
Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)166 
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of § 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate 
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he 
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee . . . .  The district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 
claims against the United States for any violation of § 1962 of this chapter by an 
employee of the Government, while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act occurred. 
Commentary 
The addition of the second provision creates an exception to the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), giving the 
federal district courts jurisdiction over claims against the United States 
                                                 
162 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing why the current methods used to combat government 
officials’ unethical behavior fail to adequately regulate federal political corruption); see also 
supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of corruption). 
163 See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) that specifically 
addresses violations by government entities, thus making RICO’s civil statute the far 
superior method of fighting government corruption). 
164 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the various benefits of the proposed amendment to the 
civil RICO statute). 
165 See infra Part IV.B (examining the proposed amendment in the context of the alleged 
RICO violations by MMS Enterprise). 
166 The proposals are the contributions of the author.  Specifically, proposed additions are 
italicized, and proposed deletions are struck.  The language in regular font is taken from 
§ 1964(c).  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1964. 
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for RICO violations by its employees.167  Although the systematic costs of 
administering remedies to private individuals for claims against the 
United States appear to be high because this amendment could 
potentially lead to insurmountable government liability and losses to the 
public treasury, this law is more likely to deter government officials from 
participating in unlawful behavior that conceivably results in public loss 
or injury.168  Indeed, holding government entities liable for RICO 
violations by individual officials would present plaintiffs with a more 
readily identifiable defendant, and would likely effectuate change 
because government agencies have more power to implement reform 
than lower-level officials.169 
While this amendment appears to resolve many of the obstacles 
private parties face when pursuing a claim against the United States, 
there are no crystalline solutions to government corruption.  Critics 
disavow the idea of inherently punishing American citizens—
compensating victims who prevail on a claim against a governmental 
entity with taxpayer dollars—to aid an individual suffering as a result of 
a dishonest government employee’s illegal actions.170  Nonetheless, the 
costs of federal corruption and waste are imposed on taxpayers under 
any circumstances.171  Accordingly, spending taxpayer dollars to assist 
victims of government RICO violations is considerably more beneficial 
to citizens because their money is used to compensate innocent victims, 
rather than deceitful government officials. 
Perhaps the proposed amendment to § 1964(c) would make the civil 
RICO statute the superior method of remedying government corruption, 
as racketeering activity prohibits an extensive range of criminal 
                                                 
167 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346; see also supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text (discussing the 
policy justifications that support waiving the sovereign immunity doctrine for claims 
against the government).  While some procedural issues will need to be adapted to 
accommodate claims against the United States, perhaps the Department of Justice could 
recommend the necessary amendments to the statute as those issues are beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
168 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (expressing concern for opening the door of 
the federal fisc to thousands); supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (discussing other 
legitimate government concerns regarding civil claims against the United States); see also 
SCHUCK, supra note 148, at 98 (expressing discord with holding individual government 
officials liable for violations rather than government entities). 
169 See SCHUCK, supra note 148, at 100–07 (contrasting the current system of subjecting 
individual officials to civil liability with a system where governmental entities could be 
liable for torts by individual officials). 
170 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s fear of the burden on 
public funding). 
171 See supra Part III.B.2 (demonstrating how corrupt officials benefit from their unlawful 
schemes while depriving the government budget of its returns and forcing the general 
public to bear the costs). 
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activity.172  Because RICO proscribes the crimes most frequently 
committed by government employees, this amendment should deter 
them from engaging in virtually any dishonest behavior, in turn, cutting 
corruption and leading to a more secure, trustworthy environment for 
United States citizens.173  Ultimately, the essence of the proposed 
amendment is to cure the injustice private individuals suffer as a result 
of the government employees’ wrongful actions.174 
B. Applying the Proposed Amendment to Rinke v. BP 
Not only would the proposed amendment to the federal civil RICO 
statute be revolutionary, but it would also dramatically change the 
outcome of Rinke.175  Plaintiffs could name MMS as a defendant in the 
class action suit, and MMS would be civilly liable to them for injuries 
suffered as a direct result of the government agency’s participation in 
racketeering activity.  Furthermore, MMS would suffer the consequences 
of its corrupt behavior because it would be required to provide private 
relief to the plaintiffs in Rinke.  If Rinke was decided under the current 
federal civil RICO statute, MMS would be permitted to escape liability 
for its participation in BP’s unlawful scheme.176  However, MMS appears 
to be equally responsible for the oil spill in the Gulf Coast, and has been 
participating in schemes similar to the one that led to the recent spill for 
                                                 
172 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (enumerating the criminal activities prohibited by RICO); see 
also supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the lack of available avenues addressing government 
corruption at the federal level). 
173 See supra Part III.B.2 (presenting the negative effects corruption has on the United 
States and the positive impact this amendment potentially could have on the country and 
its citizens). 
174 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (exemplifying a particular instance in 
which many individuals suffered injury due to a government agency’s alleged 
participation in racketeering activity).  The public will also benefit due to the restoration of 
justice, and a government free from corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.  See Curato, supra 
note 7, at 1042 and text accompanying note 7 (stating that dishonest government officials 
have ultimately deprived “the public of its right to a government free from corruption, 
fraud, and dishonesty”); see also Haskel & Haskel, supra note 145, at 491–92 (recognizing 
that immunizing the government from civil liability “promotes loss of public confidence in 
government actors as credible sources of information and will eventually erode the public’s 
perception that the judiciary is fulfilling its role as guardian of the constitutional rights of 
private individuals against government abuse”). 
175 See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 8 (providing Rinke’s Class Action 
Amended Complaint, which contains Rinke’s allegations that BP and MMS committed 
RICO violations); supra Part II.C (providing a detailed description of BP’s alleged RICO 
violations). 
176 See Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 161–71 (claiming that MMS participated in 
BP’s unlawful scheme while neglecting its watchdog policing responsibilities of ensuring 
that offshore drilling operations are conducted safely). 
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several years.177  Therefore, the proposed amendment to the federal civil 
RICO statute is appropriate to assist all victims of the disastrous spill, as 
no person or enterprise—regardless of whether it is subject to 
government authority—should be free from liability for acts so 
detrimental to a nation’s economy, environment, and citizens. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
To date, the Supreme Court has denied relief to private parties 
attempting to bring civil RICO actions against governmental entities, as a 
RICO claim cannot be maintained against the United States absent an 
express waiver of sovereign immunity.  As a result of this fundamental 
doctrine, in concert with the deficiency of laws currently designed to 
regulate government officials’ behavior, the United States’ citizenry has 
become accustomed to a government immersed in corruption.  While 
several private parties have successfully pursued claims against 
individual officials for their corrupt acts, a system in which 
governmental entities are also held liable would be more beneficial to the 
public.  Furthermore, governmental entities that fail to administer to 
their employees and regularly undermine the integrity of the 
government—to the citizens’ detriment—should not be immune from 
civil liability for RICO violations. 
When analyzing RICO’s text and the legislature’s intent when 
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1964, Congress did not give the impression that it 
intended to limit its scope to protect government agencies, as RICO was 
constructed predominantly to prevent organized crime among 
government and legitimate businesses.  Moreover, the Bill of Rights was 
created to honor individual rights and protect private individuals 
mistreated by the government.  The courts’ current approach of 
deferring to government actors and immunizing government entities 
from liability is at odds with the government’s objective of instilling 
public confidence in its operations because it exonerates actors who 
subordinate private individuals’ rights.  Additionally, the basic 
principles of fairness, government credibility, and public welfare all 
generate the need for a clear avenue conducive to the liberation of the 
government from such harmful acts. 
Although RICO claims involving government representatives are 
relatively uncommon, racketeering activity among government agencies 
is becoming quite routine.  Corruptive government entities participating 
                                                 
177 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text (noting MMS’s willingness to 
accommodate the oil companies, rather than provide American citizens with honest 
services). 
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in such activity have no incentive to terminate their illegal actions, as the 
individual perks significantly outweigh any fear of punishment that they 
perceive.  Indeed, the United States has already suffered severe 
consequences for its failure to address this issue, as MMS appears to be 
partially responsible for the damages that accrued from the oil 
catastrophe.  How much hardship do citizens have to endure before 
Congress takes action? 
Perhaps the oil spill would never have occurred if the proposed 
amendment to the federal civil RICO statute had been in effect prior to 
the mishap because a government representative’s fear of subjecting his 
entire agency—and the United States accordingly—to liability would 
deter most government officials from participating in unlawful schemes 
that negatively affect the public interest and ultimately the entire 
country.  Therefore, enacting this proposed amendment would not only 
bolster the government’s attempt to restore justice and integrity, but it 
would also give rise to a more secure nation in which the citizens can 
trust their leaders. 
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